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Underclass and Overclass
Race, Class, and Economic Inequality 
in the Managerial Age
William A. Darity, Jr. 
University of North Carolina
Managers tend to identify the welfare of mankind as a whole 
with their own interests and the salvation of mankind with 





Contentious disputes over the underclass concept and the underclass 
"problem" in the United States have overlooked the necessity of examina 
tion of the nature of the overdass. After all, there cannot be one without 
the other. The purpose of this discussion is to illuminate the comparatively 
uncharted geography of the elite who dominate society from above as 
a complement to the conventional inquiry into the lifestyles of those who 
live at the bottom of modern America. The full range offerees imping 
ing on the lives of the underclass cannot be understood, anyway, without 
a careful look at the motives and methods of the overclass.
It may seem odd but imagine, as the entry point to the investigation 
of America's overclass, that we are in twelfth-century England. Follow 
David Lebedoff s description of the marital selection process among the 
serf population on a feudal demesne:
It was time for Thomas to get married. He was almost eighteen, his 
father had died, and the patch of land was now his. He needed a wife
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to help with the work, to cook and sew and bear children. He needed 
a wife as much as he needed the sun and the rain and the protection of 
his feudal lord. He wanted companionship, too, and sex. These needs 
were urgent and could not be postponed.
The problem was finding a bride. In Thomas' limited world there were 
three single women of marriageable age. One was sickly, one was strong, 
and one was beautiful. He married the one who was strong. There was 
really no other choice. The sickly woman could not work his poor land, 
and the beautiful one did not want to. She had other alternatives.
Thomas' bride was named Katherine. The couple got on very well; 
neither Thomas nor Katherine ever wondered who was smarter. In 
telligence was not a factor in marital selection. There was no such thing 
as an IQ test. No one even suspected that intelligence could be measured. 
There would have been no point to such measurement. There was no 
social mobility. A person was born to a certain role and stayed there. 
The great majority of people spent their lives on the land in harsh 
drudgery.
As it happened, Katherine was much the brighter of the two. By to 
day's measurement, Thomas had an IQ of 105, and Katherine, 147. Which 
means that Thomas' intelligence was very near average (100) and 
Katherme's close to genius. Neither suspected this disparity. Both were 
illiterate. Almost everyone was. The conditions of their lives did not 
recognize, let alone reward, Katherine's special gifts.
Thomas and Katherine lived in England in the twelfth century, but the 
circumstances of their union would have been much the same in Italy 
or Russia or China, in the Middle Ages or the Renaissance. From the 
dawn of time until the eighteenth century, the process of marital selec 
tion was very much the same. Spouses were chosen from the very small 
pool of those who happened to live nearby. They were chosen without 
regard to, and without any way of knowing, what their general intelligence 
might be. 1
The consequence, according to Lebedoff, was the random distribution 
of measured intelligence across the population. Measured intelligence 
and social status were two separate matters in the Middle Ages:
By and large intelligence had nothing to do with one's station in life. A 
genius comparable to Einstein could die illiterate after a lifetime of serf 
dom in the fields. No one knew of his ability, and no one would have 
cared.2
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Lebedoff contends that three factors have altered the world of Katherine 
and Thomas, a world where measured or "general" intelligence was a 
matter of peripheral importance, to our current condition where measured 
intelligence has become a matter of central importance. First, there is 
greater geographic and social mobility, exposing people to a much wider 
range of possible marital partners. Second, virtually universal educa 
tion in the Western world (and in Japan) has had the following perverse 
effect: "If everyone can read and write, everyone can be graded and 
tested. Children can be told precisely how smart they are supposed to 
be; and that information, accepted by both the child and society, helps 
determine the choice of spouse." Third, and "most important," is the 
fact "that, today, intellectual ability is rewarded." 3 Says Lebedoff:
Now, by and large, people can rise to the level that their talent permits. 
Those with high grades go on to college and to higher-status jobs. Those 
with lower scores leave school earlier and take other kinds of jobs. The 
son of a cobbler is no longer destined always to be a cobbler himself. 
People still marry within their social and economic class, but member 
ship in such classes has come to depend more on measurable intelligence 
and less on the circumstances of birth. People of high I.Q. marry other 
people of high I.Q. no matter how disparate their parentage may be. 
Equality of opportunity has led to people being socially and economically 
stratified by virtue of their measured intelligence.4
An extreme vision of a society stratified on the basis of measured in 
telligence has been advanced by Harvard social psychologist Richard 
Hernnstein, who argued in the early 1970s for a hereditarian founda 
tion to an emerging IQ meritocracy:
... if ... one grants the possibility that mental abilities do vary at all 
genetically, then a powerful and surprising conclusion follows namely, 
that society may segregate people into social groupings or classes based 
at least partly on biology. For if mental capacity is to any degree inherited, 
and if social standing reflects mental capacity, then social standing must 
be a mirror, albeit an imperfect one, of inherited ability. Moreover, as 
society equalizes the opportunities for advancement, which is to say as 
society becomes "fairer," by the ordinary standards of fairness, it will 
tend more and more to base its social distinctions on genetic grounds. 
In other words, if parents no longer can pass social and economic
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advantages on to their children let us say, because of taxes and welfare 
and public housing and uniformly excellent public schools they will in 
stead contribute to their children's success and failure only by their genetic 
legacy.5
Both Lebedoff and Hernnstein are wrong in their acceptance of the 
"equal opportunity" myth. There is substantial evidence that academically 
high-achieving youths tend to be children of academically high-achieving 
parents. This is indicative of diminishing interclass mobility, rather than 
increasing equalization of opportunities, because high-achieving parents 
are far more able to guarantee quality education for their own children 
than parents who have been defeated by the educational system.6
Nevertheless, Lebedoff and Hernnstein have glimpsed an idealized 
vision of our unfolding future Lebedoff as a brutal critic and Hernn 
stein as an unabashed enthusiast in which putative mental capacity dic 
tates social class position. Both of them have grasped the great transi 
tion that is international in character the rise to dominance of intellec 
tuals, the intelligentsia, and the technocrats.
Recent events in Eastern Europe, suggestive of the collapse of socialism 
and the victory of the Western way, obscure the continued preeminence 
there, as well, of the intellectuals, intelligentsia, and the technocrats. 
For the movement toward democraticization and the dismantling of a 
totalitarian apparatus means a switch from the control of one group of 
social managers predisposed toward political and economic bureaucratic 
authoritarianism, to another group, predisposed toward electoral politics 
and the rejuvenation of private enterprise.7
What Lebedoff and Hernnstein sense is the international convergence 
toward a class structure where the dominant class the modern 
overclass possesses vast ideological fluidity. The class structure has 
at its apex the managerial class, comprised of those with putative men 
tal capacity and putative ability to manage, i.e., design and execute social 
control strategies and tactics. The managerial class analyzes, constructs, 
and administers social policy. The cultural manifestation of their influence 
over contemporary America is evident in the lifestyles of the "Yuppies." 8
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Class analytical explorations of social stratification patterns have been 
ambiguous with respect to the position of those persons holding profes 
sional positions. In Marxist class-theoretic studies, professional workers 
typically either fold into the working class or are treated as agents of 
capital.9
It is, however, more fruitful to view the professionals as forming an 
independent social class situated apart from labor proper and capital. 
Not only do they form a separate social class, but they form a social 
class driven toward its own destiny. Only by recognizing the distinc- 
tiveness of the managerial class can we see the rich outlines of the 
emergency of the new social order. The importance of mental capacity 
and the ability to manage has overtaken the authority of wealth and 
finance.10 Capitalism winds down and the managerial estate winds up.
The Genesis of the Managerial Class
In the United States, the origins of the managerial class can be traced 
to the Progressive Era at the turn of the century. Development of a cadre 
of workers ("social" workers in the broadest sense) to minister to the 
perceived needs of the working class was the incubator for the develop 
ment of the professions. The process was sponsored by corporate 
America.11 The managerial class in its infancy was the progeny of 
American capital.
Consequently, this new class was dependent on corporate capital and, 
necessarily, subservient. Largely coterminous with the middle classes 
that also harbored an older group of small businessmen the petty 
bourgeoisie the members of the managerial class, even those who were 
social workers for the working class, espoused a certain attachment to 
the precepts of rugged individualism.
But the decisive event that changed all this was the Great Depression. 
An ideological shift took place among the middle classes from in 
dividualism to New Dealism a cry for "relief." 12 The managerial class 
endorsed an apparent "reform" of capitalism that was in fact a revolu 
tion. Of course, it was not a revolution on behalf of the working class, 
but on behalf of the middle classes themselves.
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Here is the starting point of James Burnham's "managerial revolu 
tion" in the crucible of maximal capitalist crisis.13 Here are the begin 
nings of the self-conscious commitment to macroeconomic stabilization 
policy, activist fiscal and monetary policy, and macroeconomic manage 
ment, bolstered by the gathering of data and the development of national 
income accounts. Here is where the foundation of the welfare state was 
established, where the federal government de facto took an open hand 
in the development of a national family policy.
The principle of an unlimited, rather than the formerly limited, ter 
rain for the state became accepted. The extension of the state meant that 
the welfare state cushioned both the members of the middle and work 
ing classes from the exigencies of the capitalist business cycle. But, in 
addition, the extension of the state meant expanded employment oppor 
tunities for the middle class, giving them a dual benefit.
Thus, the managerial class discovered a route for loosening the um 
bilical cord, which had bound it to corporate capital, through the growth 
of the public sector. World War n and, thereafter, the Great Society and 
civil rights movement constituted further bases for still more dramatic 
expansion. The social programs of the 1960s coupled with civil rights 
legislation can be construed as a response to race revolt, and the new 
positions in public sector welfare agencies were obtained disproportionate 
ly by black professionals.14 This was the essential source of growth in 
the black middle class trumpeted by scholars and journalists in the 1970s.
The combination of the Great Society and civil rights movement took 
the scope of government beyond the breakthrough achieved by the New 
Deal. The judiciary, in particular, took on direct involvement in public 
policymaking, including management of school systems and prison 
systems.15 The inherent limitlessness to the managerial state was manifest.
Curing Poverty and Racial Inequality?
Simultaneously, the ideological illusion was fostered that poverty could 
be abolished by constructive public action. This illusion was consistent 
with the belief system of the rising managerial class. Their social manage-
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ment mentality led to a presumption that they could solve any problem 
with research and sound thinking a certain characteristic "arrogance 
of the new elite." 16
Under the passing regime of men of business the classic capitalist 
social order poverty and the social system were blatantly interconnected. 
Mercantilist thinkers, the heralds of capitalism, were cruelly straightfor 
ward in advancing the doctrine of the utility of poverty the notion that 
poverty was necessary to extract adequate effort from the laboring classes. 
Classical political economy, particularly in Ricardo's hands, elaborated 
a variety of schemes to repress wages in order to keep down costs of 
production and delay the inevitable approach to the stationary state.
Neoclassical economies' story of wage generation is encapsulated in 
the labor-leisure choice and human capital theory. Labor-leisure choice 
means some people with preferences for leisure, in effect, will select 
lower incomes. In the neoclassical' preferred world of minimum govern 
ment interference in market processes, some persons will be "idlers" 
and, hence, in poverty. But, regardless, if more persons choose to ac 
quire higher levels of human capital and pursue more work, they drive 
down the returns for everyone potentially, for some categories of jobs, 
to poverty-level wages.
In Marxist analysis, wage repression was an important avenue to 
counteract the law of the tendency for the rate of profit to fall. Capitalist 
society possessed an inherent tendency to produce unemployment, to 
create a reserve of labor, a tendency driven by the functionality of the 
reserve. The reserve was necessary to hold back the wage demands of 
those with work and to make readily available a pool of workers to throw 
into new lines of activity without disrupting older sectors.
Of course, in principle, one could always engineer a redistribution 
of income or wealth in such a way that everyone is comfortably above 
the poverty line. But the mercantilists' blunt logic holds sway. Such a 
policy would produce a large incentive problem for employers hiring 
for occupations at the low end of the wage scale. Therefore, poverty 
could not be eliminated under capitalism.
Although poverty could not be eliminated altogether, poverty could 
be reallocated by race or by gender. Proponents of racial equality 
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rather than general equality presumably seek a racial reallocation of 
poverty so that the proportion of blacks who are poor falls and/or the 
proportion of whites who are poor rises until the same ratio prevails 
among both races, e.g., 20 percent of families of each race being in 
poverty.
But would it always be the same families? William Wilson's big con 
cern in his research on the underclass is the intergenerational transmis 
sion of poverty status. He focuses on an underclass that is dispropor 
tionately black and that replicates poverty status from generation to 
generation. Therefore, racial equality for Wilson also must be understood 
in intergenerational terms.17
Suppose we have a population of twelve families; three families are 
enumerated as black and nine families are enumerated as white. In Year
1. two black families are poor or 67 percent of all black families, while 
three white families are poor or 33 percent of all white families. A racially 
equal society with respect to poverty status would be one where in Year
2. one out of the three black families (33 percent) would be poor, and 
it would be the family that was nonpoor in Year 1. And now six out 
of the nine white families (67 percent) would be poor again the families 
that previously were nonpoor. This rotation could continue indefinitely. 
While this would be a community characterized by perpetual general 
inequality, it certainly would be a community without racial inequality.
Since poverty could not be eliminated under capitalism, then the 
previous hypothetical situation reveals one feature of the best an 
egalitarian might hope for: to distribute exposure to poverty evenly across 
the population by generations. Of course, one might also hope to reduce 
poverty's scope to the level necessary for continuation of the system, 
given that one is willing to leave the social system itself intact or is un 
willing to mount an attack upon it.
Both of these egalitarian steps we might call them steps toward 
Wilsonian equality where one seeks to mute the effects of poverty while 
failing to challenge the social system have been pursued with great 
timidity, if at all. Identification of the minimum incidence of poverty 
necessary to capitalism has proved to be a virtually intractable proposi 
tion. And those groups with the power to resist exposure to the depriva 
tions of poverty will exercise their power to avoid taking their turn.
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A hierarchical society typically will have a hierarchical occupational 
structure. It is hierarchy that lays the material foundation for discrimina 
tion. Occupations with better pay, superior status, great stability, and, 
within the evolving cultural norms, which give greater weight to men 
tal rather than manual work will be preferred. If they are captured by 
a specific ethnic or racial group, the group will defend their turf from 
invasion.
This is far from Lebedoff s and Hernnstein's pure IQ meritocracy 
rooted in a genetic allocation of social status. This is stratification bas 
ed upon naked group power. Control over training, credentials, ex 
perience, and information networks dictates access to preferred 
positions not mythical equal opportunity. Indeed, to the extent that 
measured intelligence can be nurtured (to the extent that Hernnstein 
has overemphasized the hereditarian component), that can affect the 
racial distribution of slots. Ethnic or racial groups with power can ac 
tively transform potential rivals into noncompetitors by distorting the 
nurturing mechanisms. For example, they can not only insure that their 
own children go to quality schools, but they can channel children from 
potential rival ethnic or racial groups into schools where they will be 
subject to programmed retardation. Then those who are poor appear 
ex post facto to be social failures because of their own deficiencies, 
when, in fact, the genesis of those apparent deficiencies can be found 
in the execution of raw aggression by more powerful ethnic or racial 
groups seeking to preserve their own comparatively aristocratic status.
The foregoing should suggest that the transition from capitalism to 
managerial society holds no greater promise for elimination of pover 
ty. Nonetheless, the managerial elite, in all likelihood, will invest much 
time and rhetoric in holding out just such a possibility through 
"discovery" of the proper array of policies. Because managerial society 
is hierarchical as well, the motivation still will exist to produce non- 
competing groups among potential rivals. The groups reduced to the 
most extreme noncompetitive status will constitute the underclass and 
will display the central feature of a caste group the intergenerational 
repetition of low social status. Indeed, society as a whole will take on 
the character of caste civilization, for the sons and daughters of the
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managerial class also will follow in their parents' upscale footsteps. 
Thus the overclass will constitute the upper caste, de facto the perma 
nent Brahmins.
Dominant ethnic or racial groups will find it especially useful to 
degrade the mental capacity of potential rival groups, often to the point 
where members of the disinherited come to doubt their own capacity 
to perform intellectually. Consider, for example, the case of the black 
athlete and the NCAA's Proposition 48 requiring a minimum 700 SAT 
score and 2.0 high school GPA for an athlete to be eligible to play as 
a college freshman at a Division 1 school. Proposition 48 has met the 
opposition from many black coaches and presidents of historically black 
colleges and universities, suggesting that even they do not believe that 
large numbers of young black athletes are capable of meeting such 
standards.
The further twist, however, is that tests like the SAT are broadly ac 
cepted markers for access to the university. In managerial society, such 
testing and refinement of tests become the norms for entry to specializ 
ed or advanced training, separating the overclass from those beneath 
them. In American society, standardized tests tend to establish racial 
separation as well. Proportionately fewer blacks cross the mental capacity 
hurdles; of course, proportionately fewer are given the preparation to 
do so.
Managerial society aspires to pure meritocracy. Instead, it delivers 
a modern "slavocracy" based upon race and measured (or credential- 
ed) mental capacity that admits blacks in far smaller proportions than 
whites into the new elite. And even the occasional admits still are viewed 
with a skepticism not faced by their white peers. Invariably, black in 
tellectuals are stigmatized as necessarily being less capable. Two direct 
conclusions can be drawn. Poverty will not vanish in managerial society; 
neither will racial discrimination in all its dimensions.
Eugenics Once Again?
The Great Society-cum-civil rights movement was an accommoda 
tion to the aspirations of the black middle class to cope with black urban
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revolt. It was a problematic accommodation. Housing desegregation 
led to black middle class out-migration from black urban ghettos con 
tributing to destruction of the class diversity of black communities. 
School desegregation went hand in hand with deterioration of the quality 
of schooling for large numbers of black youths. Affirmative action's 
original mission was to serve as a mechanism to put those blacks into 
positions for which they were well qualified but had been excluded on 
strictly racial grounds. Later it became viewed as a means for engineering 
an end to the historically produced numerical racial imbalances across 
American society, leading to stigmatization of blacks as recipients of 
a special boost, like handicap golfers, into the positions they have 
attained.
Concomitantly, there has been a pattern of increased polarization be 
tween the black middle class and the black underclass. This is paradox 
ical, given the black middle class's overrepresentation as service pro 
viders in social welfare agencies and the black underclass's overrepresen 
tation as service recipients. 18 Spatially separate and economically distinct, 
both segments of black America share mutual vulnerability to cutbacks 
in social programs. Moreover, since the last years of the Carter ad 
ministration and throughout the Reagan administration, the accommoda 
tion plainly has been undergoing progressive reversal.
Managerial society has and will have its race and poverty problems  
glaring blots on the ostensible social perfectibility the managers' prom 
ise. Highly educated professionals long have possessed a certain fascina 
tion with eugenics social perfectibility via managed procreation. 19 
There is evidence to suggest that eugenics, which fell into disfavor with 
National Socialism's enthusiasm for its premises in the 1930s and 1940s, 
is riding a covert upsurge. For if the poor and the black poor in 
particular are not to be transformed from "undesirables" into 
"desirables," they may be removed literally by population control 
measures.
Even while eugenics was in eclipse, the managerial class generally 
maintained an ideological anti-natalism. The last eight administrations 
prior to Reagan's, dating from Roosevelt through Carter, endorsed 
population control as a significant part of an antipoverty package both 
domestically and internationally. 20 The Reagan administration was the
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first to demur. The Roosevelt administration marked the rise to 
dominance of the managerial elite with New Dealism. Population con 
trol has been targeted at the black poor both through active policy and 
through neglect. Family planning programs have been located dispropor 
tionately in black communities with the self-conscious intent of reduc 
ing black fertility. At 1970 hearings before the House Subcommittee 
on Public Health and Welfare, Atlanta physician John McCain recom 
mended continuation of the policy of funneling one-quarter of Georgia's 
family planning program into Atlanta. He pointed out that the cost of 
a "satisfactory" program would be $20 million in Georgia, $5 million 
of which should go to Atlanta. The cost of a "minimum" program would 
be $10 million, $2.5 million of which should go to Atlanta. But the 
City of Atlanta, with a population of about 497,000 people at the time, 
contained about 10 percent of the state's population. Why, then, should 
it receive one-quarter of the state's family planning budget, particular 
ly when it costs more per patient to deliver family planning services 
in rural than in urban areas? 21 It was probably more than mere coin 
cidence that Atlanta contained one-quarter of the state's black population.
Birth control services were first funded at the state level in the South 
in the early 1960s. Southern state legislatures have never been recognized 
for their desire to protect women's fertility rights. Lincoln Pashute con 
cluded an empirical study on the determinants of the introduction of 
birth control services at the state level in the U.S. with the observation 
that "Southern society and its policies [were] motivated, at least in part, 
by the desire to reduce the fertility of blacks whether for racial reasons 
or because they believe blacks make welfare demands upon the state 
in excess of their contribution, or both together." 22
The invidious and often race-specific thrust of population control 
measures apparently has affected the size of families receiving cash 
transfer assistance. In the Washington, D.C. area an area with a 75-80 
percent black population the regional welfare caseload fell 9.5 per 
cent between 1975 and 1978 according to a study prepared by Janice 
Outtz for the Greater Washington Research Center. Outtz said one reason 
was the decline in the size of the average welfare family from four 
persons in 1970 to three in 1977. A Washington Post staff writer
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speculated the decline was due to "the availability of publicly financed 
abortions under the Medicaid program that serves welfare recipients." 23 
Indeed, by 1979 there were 13,611 induced abortions performed on 
residents of the District of Columbia, considerably larger than the 9,404 
recorded live births. 24
Increased access to abortions for the poor in the 1970s coincided with 
a real decline in public assistance that continues nationally to the pres 
ent. Again in the Washington, D.C. area, the cost of living rose 68 
percent between 1970 and 1978, while payments rose only 13 percent 
in nominal terms. 25 Nationally, the combined money value of food 
stamps and AFDC payments for a family of four rose less than the cost 
of living. Between 1974 and 1979, the real purchasing power of mon 
thly AFDC plus food stamps fell from $520 to $478 or 8 percent. The 
State of Texas held AFDC payments constant at $140 per month for 
a family of four for over a decade. 26
What would be more subtly genocidal than simultaneously to pro 
vide more resources for people to limit their family size while depriv 
ing them of resources to support their children who are living? The con 
tradictions have been quite plain. Of the 5 million or so women in the 
national population whom the government identified as being "in need" 
of family planning services in the early 1970s, 70 percent were white. 
Yet "... little if anything [was] being done to reach these 3,500,000 
white women." 27 As public health physician W.A. Mason observed 
at the time, "It is no secret that in many communities, contraceptive 
services are concentrated in black communities, serving primarily blacks 
with little or no attention to the white poor, the middle class or the af 
fluent." 28
Since Joseph Califano's tenure as Secretary of Health, Education and 
Welfare, public funds no longer can be used to fund abortions. Jour 
nalist Ken Auletta has been quoted as expressing displeasure with this 
policy because of "the 'incalculable costs' of making abortion harder 
to obtain. Among those costs: More future city criminals will be in 
cubated, unwanted kids, entering the world without nurturing and self- 
esteem. " 29 Better to land a preemptory strike before birth, in Auletta's 
estimation.
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Indeed, involuntary sterilization of black women, especially welfare 
mothers, and the involuntary use of blacks in medical experiments have 
occurred on an extensive basis in the U.S. 30 The absence of public health 
and public policy measures to contain AIDS, illegal drug use, cardio 
vascular diseases, cancers, and other illnesses in the black population 
is glaring. Imprisonment and military service siphons off the black male 
population.
Capitalist society possesses a certain ambivalence about population. 
A growing population might dilute per capita income, but on the other 
hand it could provide both an extended market and slow wage growth. 
Certainly, one of Marx's key theoretical claims was the proposition that 
capitalism needed a surplus population, albeit a reasonably disciplined 
surplus was preferable. 31
An Unfinished Counterrevolution
Managerial society, in contrast, possesses undiluted anti-natalist im 
pulses. All things are to be managed and controlled, including popula 
tion, on both quantity and quality dimensions. The reversal of popula 
tion policy under Reagan's presidency is revealing of his administra 
tion's exceptionalism.
The Reagan presidency represented capital's counterrevolution against 
the managerial estate the attempt to restore a social and economic order 
that predated the New Deal. Thus, steps were taken to roll back the 
welfare state, to reduce the scope and scale of government, and to 
deregulate the financial sector. At base, what was called "meanness 
mania'' by some observers (or pure racism by others) was not primari 
ly an assault on the U.S. working class, nor was it primarily an assault 
on black America. It was first and foremost class warfare conducted 
by the business interests against the managerial class with the intention 
of reducing that class to the sycophant function it possessed in the 1920s.
But this has been an incomplete counterrevolution. A capitalist restora 
tion now depends upon an ideological struggle requiring reliance on 
expert knowledge. The business interests can go out and get their
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own experts as hired guns or mercenaries. But the language, the 
arguments, the very terms of social policy debates are established by 
members of their rival class. Ultimately, then, the managerial class will 
determine how broad or narrow the scope will be for the private sec 
tor. The right-leaning faction favors an extensive role for private enter 
prise; the left-leaning faction favors industrial policy, worker manage 
ment, and state planning of investment. This is the core ideological rup 
ture within the managerial class, aggravated by the fact that members 
of the managerial class can flexibly alter their allegiances and can even 
move back and forth between public and private sector positions. 32
Furthermore, to conduct its struggle against the managerial class, 
capital must enlist the support of the working class, particularly when 
electoral politics matter. The alliance of the 1930s was between the work 
ing class and the managerial class. This was the making of the New 
Deal coalition that only fractured some 40 years later. The alliance of 
the 1930s was built over shared benefits associated with construction 
and expansion of the welfare state. The goal was the restoration of 
economic well-being.
The alliance of the 1970s was between the working class and capital. 
This alliance was built over the issues of family, schooling, and lifestyle. 
The goals were restoration of morality, family ties, and personal worth. 
Both alliances are inherently fragile. The managerial class is uncom 
fortable with the anti-intellectualism of the working class. The work 
ing class dislikes the arrogant paternalism of the managerial class. These 
are culturally incompatible social classes.
Capital is uncomfortable with prospects of any renewal of working 
class demands for higher wages, improved working conditions, and 
especially reductions in the length of the working day. The working 
class recognizes that capital is their natural enemy. These are economical 
ly incompatible social classes.
Consider again the aforementioned fluidity of the managerial class. 
The chameleon-like quality permits the class to shift broadly, as times 
dictate, to advocacy of more free market-oriented or more state planning- 
oriented policies. This is both a class strength and weakness. It is a 
strength in dealing with capital, since the class can adapt rapidly to
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changed conditions favorable or unfavorable to its hegemony. It is a 
weakness insofar as an ideologically fractioned class can split into in 
ternal welfare.
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